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INTRODUCTION

Extreme natural hazards are well known in history. Both
the Gilgamesh Epic and the Old Testament describe epic
floods.1 The historic approach of the American people has been
* Professor of Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, Chapman University. Professor
Binder is indebted to Jim Walsh, District Counsel of the Seattle District of the Army
Corps of Engineers. Mr. Walsh hired Professor Binder, then teaching at the University
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to harness and tame nature.
This paper suggests a paradigm change to recognize the
uncontrollable risks of extreme natural hazards. All areas of
the country face extreme geological and meteorological risks.
This paper discusses the historic American approach to the
natural environment, the underlying nature of extreme
natural hazards in Washington State, California, and the New
Orleans-Mississippi River, and proposals to address these
hazards. It also lays out two historic limitations on action: the
Fifth Amendment and human nature.
A.

The Course of Civilization

Civilization has spent millennia changing the natural
environment. Early societies settled by bodies of water and
grew into villages, towns, cities, and vast metropolises.
Settlers needed water for domestic purposes, agriculture, and
transportation. Rivers, lakes, and oceans remained the
primary highways of commerce and transportation until a few
centuries ago.
Yet these cities entered into Faustian Bargains whereby
they risk flooding from upstream and the wrath of coastal
storms, especially hurricanes, from the sea. Some cities, such
as New Orleans, tempt fate from both directions.
Forces of nature define the natural environment; human
forces redefine it. Violent natural forces created the Sierras,
Cascades, and Rockies, Great Plains, and the Mojave Desert.
Water carved out the Grand Canyon and Waimea Canyon. The
Santa Anas, Sirocco winds and dust storms scour the land. The
polar vortex and Siberian Express freeze the Frost Belt while
the Pineapple Express drowns the West Coast.
Successful life forms adapt to the environment. Humans not
only adapt to the environment, but they also attempt, not
always successfully, more than any other species2 to adapt the
of Puget Sound School of Law, in 1976 to prepare a legal memorandum on the rights of
the Colville and Spokane Indians with respect to the construction of Grand Collee
Dam, thereby introducing Professor Binder to infrastructure issues. His thanks to the
University of Washington School of Law and the “Before the Big One” Symposium for
the opportunity to bring these thoughts together.
1. See Tikva Frymer-Kensky, What the Babylonian Flood Stories Can and Cannot
Teach Us About the Genesis Flood, 4 BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REV. 32 (1978).
2. Beavers are amazing engineers, but their expertise is limited to low head, wooden
dams. They know their limits. See How Beavers Build Dams, PUB . BROAD. SERV. (May
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environment to their will. Forces of nature such as
earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, and tornadoes can be
devastating and unbendable to human will. Hubristic humans
believed they could control these hazards.
B.

The Drive and Confidence of the American People

Settlers spanned the North American continent within 250
years, starting with conquering the forbidding wilderness of
the Atlantic Seaboard. Explorers, wagon trains, railroads, and
then highways spanned the continent. Settlers, first by
themselves and increasingly through engineers, tried to tame
or control the forces of nature. They fought nature with dams,
levees and diversions. They transferred water between basins.
Americans created or destroyed lakes,3 rivers, and streams.
The settlers leveled or created mountains. Seattle,
Washington, a city of hills, once had more. A large regrading
project a century ago flattened much of central Seattle. Denny
Hill, one neighborhood affected by the project, covered sixtytwo city blocks; it was leveled over eight years creating the
area known as The Denny Regrade.4
Americans drained, dredged, and filled wetlands, which
14, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/leave-it-to-beavers-video-how-beavers-builddams/8847/.
3. The City of Los Angeles diverted the Owens River to Los Angeles through an
aqueduct in 1913. The city continued to grow and then diverted four streams from
Mono Lake to the Owens Valley Aqueduct, causing substantial environmental damage
to the rapidly shrinking lake. Litigation resulted in a reassessment of the diversion.
See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 713–14 (Cal. 1983).
Destroying large bodies of water is not confined to the United States. Both the
Soviet Union with the Aral Sea and Iran with Lake Urmia have essentially killed two
large lakes through diversions. Lake Urmia, once the largest fresh water lake in the
Middle East and twice the size of Luxembourg, shrank by 90% and split in half in
2008. Ali Mirchi et al., Lake Urmia: How Iran’s Most Famous Lake is Disappearing,
GUARDIAN (January 23, 2015, 7:54 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/iranblog/2015/jan/23/iran-lake-urmia-drying-up-new-research-scientists-urge-action.
See
also Thomas Erdbrink, Its Great Lake Shriveled, Iran Confronts Crisis of Water
Supply,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
30,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/world/middleeast/its-great-lake-shriveled-iranconfronts-crisis-of-water-supply.html.
The Aral Sea, which bestrides Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, was once the fourth
largest saline lake in the world. The lake’s volume shrunk to 201 km3 by 1998 from
1,060 km3 in 1960. The salinity level jumped to 100 g/l (grams per litre) from 10 g/m
(grams per meter) in the same period. The Aral Sea Crisis, COLUM.,
http://www.columbia.edu/~tmt2120/introduction.htm (last visited May 24, 2017).
4. ROGER SALE, SEATTLE, PAST TO PRESENT 75–76 (1976).
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were viewed as wastelands. The Supreme Court wrote in 1900:
If there is any fact which may be supposed to be known
by everybody, and, therefore by courts, it is that
swamps and stagnant waters are the cause of malarial
and malignant fevers, and that the police power is
never more legitimately exercised than in removing
such nuisances.5
As America expanded and technology grew, the confidence of
Americans to surmount any natural or human obstacle arose.
People of the American nation excelled at modifying the
natural environment. Indeed, the purpose of the natural
environment was to serve the people. They moved water
through canals, channels, tunnels, and viaducts. They
harnessed the forces of nature by damming, draining,
dredging,6 bridging, channelization, diverting and building
locks7 on the mighty rivers of America.
Americans built great cities, spanning the continent with
ribbons of asphalt, steel rails, and pipelines. Americans
restrained water behind reservoirs and built coastal
breakwaters to hold back the ocean. They harnessed water for
domestic purposes, irrigation, hydroelectricity, and flood
management. They electrified the country, built harbors, and
reached to the stars with skyscrapers. They bridged the
Golden Gate and built the Grand Coulee Dam.
The American people experienced a rising standard of living
and quality of life. They thought public health and sanitation
problems were solved. The scourge of polio was eradicated. The
Greatest Generation won World War II. The nation that sent a
man to the moon believed it was capable of surmounting any
engineering challenge.8

5. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
6. Many of our great ports and navigable channels were created or maintained
through dredging. For example, today’s Port of Los Angeles was a three foot deep bog
when Juan Cabrillo, the Spanish explorer, reached the confluence of the Los Angeles
River and the Pacific Ocean. The desolate tide flats were developed into one of the
world’s great man-made ports. Timeline of Historic Events, PORT OF L.A.,
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/history/timeline.asp (last visited May 25, 2017).
7. The Hiram A. Chittenden Locks (Ballard Locks) are a century old. They connect
Puget Sound to Lake Washington. Their initial construction in 1912, followed by
breaching a temporary dam at Montlake, led to the formal opening on July 4, 1917.
The connection resulted in lowering Lake Washington by at least eight feet. See State
v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 161, 135 P. 1035, 1036 (Wash. 1913).
8. Professor Robin Craig of the University of Utah refers to the narrative as

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss2/5

4

Binder: The Nature of Extreme Natural Risks in the Natural Environment

344

II.

WASH. J. ENVTL. LAW & POL'Y

[Vol. 7:2

THE REALITY OF WILD NATURE VERSUS THE
HUBRIS OF HUMANITY

We now understand natural phenomenon can defy the
hubris and ingenuity of humans.
A.

The “Extreme” Forces of Nature

Every state is at risk for extreme natural hazards, which
defy human control. “Extreme hazards” is a misnomer.
Natural hazards can be geologic or meteorological. A definition
of natural hazard is “those elements of the physical
environment, harmful to man and caused by forces extraneous
to him.”9 Nature is nature. It can be mild or fierce. Extreme
forces of nature may be presently uncontrollable by humans,
but they are natural forces. Great cost in lives, property, and
dollars demonstrate the limits of human ability to control
geological and meteorological risks. Humans cannot prevent or
deter the extreme, unavoidable forces of nature, such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, volcanoes, ice
storms, and wildfires10 nor more common risks such as
flooding.
Uncontrollable forces of nature are foreseeable to experts
and students of history. A tornado in Kansas, volcanic eruption
in Washington, earthquake in Los Angeles, hurricane in
Florida, tsunami in Alaska, or a severe ice storm in the
Northeast11 are highly foreseeable, even if rare as major
incidents. Two commentators recognized:

“Humans as Controlling Engineers.” Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Live with the
Trickster: Narrating Climate Change and the Value of Resilience Thinking, 33 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 354 (2016). Her narrative “emphasizes human control over
nature.” Id. at 363.
9. What
are
Natural
Hazards?,
ORG.
OF
AM.
STATES,
https://www.oas.org/dsd/publications/Unit/oea54e/ch05.htm (last visited May 8, 2017)
(quoting IAN BURTON ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENT AS HAZARD (Oxford Univ. Press,
1978)).
10. Wildfires may be of natural causes, such as lightning, or unnatural causes.
11. The Great Ice Storm of 1998 first struck on January 5, 1998, followed by eighty
hours of freezing rain and drizzle. Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont in the
United States and New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and Quebec in Canada felt
the brunt of the storm. Millions lost power, often for weeks. Forty-five died, mostly
from hypothermia. Lesley-Ann Dupigny-Giroux, Impacts And Consequences Of The Ice
Storm Of 1988 For The North American North-East, 55 WEATHER 7 (January 2000),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.1477-8696.2000.tb04012.x/abstract.
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Though triggered by natural events such as floods and
earthquakes, disasters are increasingly man-made.
Some disasters (flood, drought, famine) are caused more
by environmental and resource mismanagement than
by too much or too little rainfall. The impact of other
disasters, which are triggered by acts of nature
(earthquake, volcano, hurricane) are magnified by
unwise human actions.12
Every state is at risk for earthquakes, but the two fault lines
which pose the greatest risks are on the West Coast. Other
regions impacted by earthquakes are the Intermountain West;
the Mississippi Valley; Missouri; and Charleston, South
Carolina.13 The San Andreas and Cascadia Faults cover the
three coastal states on the West Coast, while the New Madrid
Fault is a threat in the Mississippi Valley.14 The Pacific Ring of
Fire contains live, but mostly dormant, volcanoes which put
the West Coast from California to Alaska and Hawaii at risk. 15
Tornado Alley spans the mid-section of the United States
from Texas north to Canada. Oklahoma has witnessed several
major tornadoes in recent years.16 Alabama, Louisiana, and

12. ANDERS WIJKMAN & LLOYD TIMBERLAKE, NATURAL DISASTERS: ACTS OF GOD OR
ACTS OF MAN 6 (1984).
13. Brian Clark Howard, Earthquake Maps Reveal Higher Risks for Much of U.S.,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(July
18,
2014),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/07/140717-usgs-earthquake-mapsdisaster-risk-science/.
14. The New Madrid Fault set off three large earthquakes between December 1811
and February 1812. The earthquakes were so intense as to set off church bells on the
East Coast. The good news is that the affected area was sparsely settled two centuries
ago. John Rafferty, New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–12, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
(Dec. 14, 2011), https://www.britannica.com/event/New-Madrid-earthquakes-of-18111812; Summary of 1811–1812 New Madrid Earthquakes Sequence, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURV., https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/events/18111812newmadrid/summary.php (last visited May 25, 2017).
15. At least 169 active volcanoes are in the United States. Adrienne LaFrance, The
Scary State of Volcano Monitoring in the United States, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/the-scary-state-of-volcanomonitoring-in-the-united-states/518124/.
The Kilauea Volcano on the Big Island of Hawaii is one of the most active in the
world. It has been in constant eruption since 1983. The lava is flowing most of the time
on the surface to the Pacific Ocean, having destroyed hundreds of homes and other
structures. Mary Bagley, Kilauea Volcano: Facts About the 30-Year Eruption, LIVE SCI.
(Sept. 16, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.livescience.com/27622-kilauea.html.
16. Moore, Oklahoma experienced five tornadoes in five years. The most severe was
on May 20, 2013. Twenty-four died, including seven children in their school, when the
tornado struck. Two hundred and twelve were injured, over 1,000 homes destroyed,
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Mississippi also experience severe tornadoes.17 Tornadoes are
not limited to Tornado Alley any more than seismic risks are
limited to the Cascadia, New Madrid, and San Andreas Faults.
For example, New England periodically experiences tornadoes.
A F3 tornado18 struck central and western Massachusetts on
June 1, 2011.19 Three hundred and fifty homes and businesses
were destroyed and over 1,500 damaged in Springfield and
surrounding communities. 20 The tornado’s path was thirtynine miles long.21 Wildfires are a major threat in the West22
and other regions domestically and internationally experience
wildfire threats.23
and much of Moore leveled. Jon Schuppe, Moore, Oklahoma Slammed by Five
Tornadoes in Five Years, NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2015, 12:25 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/5-tornadoes-5-years-moore-oklahoma-dustsagain-n330561.
The deadliest tornado in American history was the March 18, 1925 Tri-State
Tornado, which plowed through thirteen counties in southwestern Missouri, southern
Illinois, and southwestern Indiana. Six-hundred and ninety-five deaths were recorded
dead along with 2,027 injuries. It cut a swath 219 miles long by up to one mile wide.
The average speed was sixty-two miles-per-hour, but it reached up to seventy-three
miles-per-hour. Tri-State Tornado Facts and Information, TORNADO FACTS,
http://www.tornadofacts.net/tri-state-tornado-facts.php (last visited May 8, 2017); see
also GEOFF PARTLOW, AMERICA’S DEADLIEST TWISTER: THE TRI-STATE TORNADO OF
1925 (2014).
17. For example, 843 tornadoes were confirmed in the United States from January
through August, with another 142 pending confirmation for the remainder of the year.
Tornadoes — Annual 2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. INFO. (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/tornadoes/201613.
18. Hurricanes are usually measured on the Fujita Scale. An F2 will have winds
between 113–157 mph whereas a F5’s winds will be between 261–318 mph. Rachelle
Oblack,
The
Enhanced
Fujita
Scale
Explained,
T HOUGHT CO,
https://www.thoughtco.com/enhanced-fujita-scale-explained-3444286 (last updated
March 1, 2017).
19. THE REPUBLICAN, PATH OF FURY: THE JUNE 1, 2011 TORNADO LEFT A 39-MILE
TRAIL OF DEVASTATION THROUGH WESTERN AND CENTRAL MASSACHUSETTS 4–5 (2011).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Southern California suffered an epidemic of wildfires in 2003. One of the largest
was the Grand Prix Fire, which consumed about 60,000 acres and merged into the Old
Fire, another wildfire. See ERICH KRAUSS, WALL OF FLAME: THE HEROIC BATTLE TO
SAVE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 223 (2006).
23. Australia has a history of suffering through “bushfires.” See Ken Eastwood,
Living
with
Bushfires,
AUSTL.
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
4,
2009),
http://www.australiangeographic.co.au/topics/science-environment/2009/06/living-withbushfires. See also Australian Bushfires: List of the Worst Fire Disasters, TELEGRAPH,
(Feb.
8,
2009,
11:22
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/4557752/
Australian-bushfires-List-of-the-worst-fire-disasters.html.
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Flooding is a major risk in much of the United States, even
in arid areas where sudden thunderstorms or cloud bursts can
cause flash floods. The mountain valleys of Appalachia and the
Rockies are subject to flash floods, often with little warning.24
Parts of the country are protected by levees, as in
California’s Central Valley, New Orleans, and major stretches
of the Mississippi River. New Orleans depends on both levees
and pumps to protect itself from flooding.25 If both fail, as
occurred during Hurricane Katrina, the consequences are
catastrophic for New Orleans and the surrounding parishes. 26
Just as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, a levee
system is only as strong as its weakest levee. In this respect
the levee system protecting the Central Valley is believed to be
weak.27
Hurricanes are a constant threat along the Gulf Coast and
eastern seaboard. Frequency is greater in the Southeast then
the Northeast, but Hurricane Sandy, which ravaged New
Jersey and New York,28 is not a historical anomaly. The builtup environment on Cape Cod, Long Island, and along the
littoral zone put those regions at risk for flooding like that seen
in Hurricane Sandy,29 which was not the first to strike the

24. For example, the Big Thompson Canyon Flash Flood of July 31, 1976 in the
Colorado Rockies, below Estes Park, Colorado, killed 145 persons, and caused
substantial property damage. A storm dropped a foot of rain in the canyon in a threehour period. The wall of water reached nineteen feet high. Colorado Remembers Big
Thompson
Canyon
Flash
Flood
of
1776,
NOAA
(July
30,
2001),
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories/s688.htm.
25. New Orleans has the world’s most extensive pumping system. Brian Handwerk,
New Orleans Levees Not Built for Worst Case Events, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 2,
2005),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0902_050902_katrina_levees.html.
26. The flooding and hurricane risks to New Orleans in this paper use “New
Orleans” to cover the greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area, which includes Orleans,
St. Bernard, St. Charles, Jefferson, and Tammany Parishes.
27. “The US Army Corps of Engineers rated the maintenance of 120 miles of
Sacramento River levees north and south of Colusa as unacceptable.” Nat’l Flood
Services, Corps of Engineers Rates Sacramento River Levees Upkeep as Unacceptable,
FLOOD
TOOLS
(May
13,
2013),
http://floodtools.com/flooded-newsitem/2013/05/13/corps-of-engineers-rates-sacramento-river-levee-upkeep-asunacceptable.
28. Hurricane Sandy was an extreme storm which struck New Jersey and New York.
It was not though, and will not be, the first or last hurricane to lash the eastern
seaboard. See Mark Fischetti, The East Coast Is Extremely Vulnerable to Hurricane
Flooding, SCI. AM. (Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-eastcoast-is-extremely-vulnerable-to-hurricane-flooding/.
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Northeast.
The Category 3 New England Hurricane of 1938 hit Long
Island and Connecticut with a storm surge of ten to twelve
feet, sustained winds of 121 mph, and gusts up to 183 mph.30
During another Category 3 hurricane on August 31, 1954, the
storm surge flood waters reached depths from eight to ten feet
in downtown Providence, Rhode Island. The storm caused sixty
deaths and $461 million in damages.31 Hurricane Agnes on
June 22–25, 1972 dropped between fourteen to nineteen inches
of rain in the northeastern United States.32
B.

Although Foreseeable, Extreme Forces of Nature Cannot
Often Be Predicted with Sufficient Specificity to Avoid
Impacts

Normal weather conditions, such as droughts, heat waves,
lightning, fog, frost, blizzards, and wind storms are common in
many areas.33 They often present great dangers, but residents
have learned to live and cope with these risks;34 these events
often provide advance warnings of their onset that residents
should be familiar with.
Extreme natural hazards are different. Many extreme
hazards can be identified, but the identification of risks is but
a preliminary step in controlling the risk, which is still often
outside human capability. For example, hydrologists can map
floodplains and geologists can identify seismic zones, but they
cannot necessarily predict the timing, severity, and locale of
impact. Thus, a general recognition of a potential extreme
hazard does not necessarily allow for specific predictions. The
timing of an earthquake, its location, duration, velocity,
magnitude, point of impact, and direction are still
unforeseeable. Tornadoes can often be tracked with warnings
29. Both Long Island and Cape Cod stick out into the Atlantic. Storms that might
otherwise skirt the coast may strike them head-on.
30. Hurricanes in History, NOAA, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history (last
visited May 8, 2017).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. For example, Southern California is subject to drought, flooding, landslides,
brush fires, wildfires, mudslides, and Santa Ana winds.
34. Prosser and Keeton posit “a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual
weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature.” W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 44 at 304 (5th Ed. 1984).
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available to seek shelter, but the locus of a tornado touchdown
is unpredictable.35
Similarly, even if the timing and course of hurricanes are
generally foreseeable, the path of destruction is not. Where
and when they make landfall is uncertain. Two prime
examples are Hurricanes Rita and Ike. Both hurricanes had
the potential to rival Katrina with their impacts. They inflicted
substantial damage to coastal areas.36 Rita mostly missed
Texas, but struck New Orleans, re-flooding part of the city
because the failed levees had not been completely restored.37
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 reminded Texas residents of
hurricane dangers. Hurricane Rita headed for the TexasLouisiana coast three weeks after Hurricane Katrina.38 The
warnings were ominous. A mass evacuation heeded the
warnings.39 Traffic stalled on I-45, as one would encounter in a
terrible rush hour.40 Yet, the hurricane inflicted most of its
damage on Louisiana. Hurricane Ike struck Galveston on
September 13, 2008, flooding much of Galveston, engendering
insured losses of $12 billion,41 but leaving much of Texas
relatively unscathed. Winds reached up to 110 mph with
eighteen inches of rain. The storm surge was up to twenty
feet.42 The hurricane was devastating, but its potential
35. A semi-facetious observation living in the Midwest is that the tornado will find
the low-lying trailer park.
36. Hurricane Rita was estimated to have caused $12 billion in damages. Jon
Erdman, Hurricane Rita Should Never Be Forgotten, WEATHER CHANNEL (Sept. 22,
2015, 12:00 AM), https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/hurricane-rita-forgottenlouisiana-texas-sep2005.
37. Hurricane Rita breached the levees along Lake Pontchartrain and had a storm
surge of fifteen feet along the Louisiana coast. 2005- Hurricane Rita, HURRICANES: SCI.
AND SOC’Y, http://www.hurricanescience.org/history/storms/2000s/rita/ (last visited
May 25, 2017).
38. Carol Christian, 8 Years Ago, Seemingly All of Houston Evacuated Ahead of
Hurricane
Rita,
HOUS .
CHRON.
(Sept.
24,
2013,
2:53
PM),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/8-years-ago-seemingly-allof-Houston-evacuated-4839142.php.
39. Id.
40. Id. One of the lessons from Rita is that the authorities should open exit lanes on
both sides of a freeway to expedite the evacuation.
41. Hurricane Ike Claims Total Nearly $12B in Texas, INS. J. (June 29, 2010),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2010/01/29/106989.htm.
42. Dennis Mersereau, Five Years Later, Hurricane Ike Still Remembered Deep in the
Hearts
of
Texans,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
13,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/09/13/five-yearslater-hurricane-ike-still-remembered-deep-in-the-heart-of-
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damages could have been much worse had it directly struck
Dallas or Houston.
III. THE LIMITS OF HUMANS
Natural risks persist despite the greatest efforts of
engineers. Try as they might, humans often lack the capacity
to control extreme forces of nature, such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, tornadoes, and volcanoes. Their actions may even
worsen the effects of natural hazards.
The reality is that every major disaster, even of seemingly
natural origin, will undoubtedly involve human fault of some
sort; a combination of poor decisions and acts of negligence will
often coalesce to magnify impact and damages.43 It could be a
judgment call, but quite often negligence lies in planning,
design, construction, operations, maintenance or inspection.
Deferred maintenance may especially be a problem with older
facilities and systems.
The famous architect Ian McHarg taught us to design with
nature to minimize risks, to build with, as opposed to, nature,
and thereby minimize potential environmental problems and
natural hazards.44 Unfortunately, his advice has often been
ignored.45 For example, humans filled in wetlands and paved
the upriver areas, increasing the risks downstream.46 Inland
wetlands can serve as a giant sponge. Draining, dredging, or
filling them, paving the land, and building upstream, increases
downstream flooding risks by increasing the water flow. 47
Pervious layers of soil are replaced with impervious layers of
asphalt, cement, roofing, and tile.
texas/?utm_term=.460cbaad03cd.
43. Seemingly after every major disaster in the United States, an “I told you so”
memo, report, or email emerges, highlighting the flaws in the design and predicting
the ultimate failure. Human fault can include negligence, intentional wrongs, such as
terrorism, or failure to plan for the accident. Negligence can be involved in the design,
construction, maintenance, operations, or inspections of a facility. See Denis Binder,
Act of God? Or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort Law, 15
REV. LITIG. 1, 31–32 (1996).
44. See generally IAN L. MCHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969).
45. Architects and engineers make recommendations to the client, but the client
decides on the final design.
46. See e.g., Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016)
(finding no liability because of sovereign immunity).
47. See Denis Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light
of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1972).
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Great challenges exist in fighting the forces of nature.
Meteorologists can track the course of a hurricane, but cannot
predict exactly where and when it will strike land. Science can
map the major fault lines, but cannot predict when and where
“The Big One” will occur.48 Furthermore, the ferocity of the
natural hazards often cannot be tempered by engineering and
design measures. Facilities and structures have design
limits,49 which may be inadequate against extreme natural
risks.50
Try as they might, humans cannot tame nature. They may
temper the rivers, but they cannot prevent flooding. Rivers
exceed flood levels even when dammed and channeled.
Saturated soils and heavy precipitation can exceed the storage
capacity of the ground and reservoirs. Little protection can also
be offered to those living on hillsides and mountains against
large runoffs.51
Humans remain at risk of geological and meteorological
forces. Most rivers, streams, creeks, and dry washes do not
flood out continually. The levees, dams, and diversions provide
a large, but not absolute, margin of safety for the “normal”
hazards of nature.52 Congress recognized the impossibility of
preventing all flooding when it expressly retained sovereign
immunity for water control projects, which include a flood
control purpose.53
Human activity can reduce natural risks, but also enhance

48. The Big One is defined as an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 or larger. David K.
Lynch,
The
Big
One,
SANANDREASFAULT.ORG,
http://www.sanandreasfault.org/BigOne.html (last visited May 29, 2017).
49. For a discussion of design limits, see infra notes 157–72 and accompanying text.
50. See Michael D. Dettinger & B. Lynn Ingram, Megastorms Could Drown Massive
Portions
of
California,
SCI.
AM.
(Jan.
2013),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/megastorms-could-down-massive-portionsof-california/. See also infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
51. For example, eighteen inches of rain fell on Mount Rainier in thirty-six hours on
November
6–7,
2006.
November
2006
Flood,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/mora/learn/news/november-2006-flooding.htm (last visited May 9,
2017).
52. For example, the heavy precipitation in California during the winter of 2017 has
resulted in floods. See Jonathan Lloyd, Aerial Photos of California’s Winter 2017
Floods,
Storm
Damage,
NBC
LOS
ANGELES
(Mar
7,
2017),
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/multimedia/Aerial-Photos-Images-Flood-FloodingCalifornia-Winter-Storms-414728243.html.
53. “No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2012).
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the risks and impacts of natural hazards, such as wildfires,
especially when trees have been weakened by drought. The
urban interface where homes invade the forest changes the
dynamics of firefighting. Fire fighters must deploy resources to
prevent, if possible, damage to residences rather than to
directly fighting the fire. Residents with flammable roofs or
dry foliage abutting the structure are courting a disaster with
wildfires. 54
A.

Washington State: Natural Beauty and Natural Hazards

Those of us who live in, or have resided in, Puget Sound and
the Pacific Northwest are well familiar with the area’s natural
beauty and recreational opportunities. We also understand
that the mountains, hills, rivers, and the Sound present
geological risks. A look at natural disasters and risks in
Washington State illustrates the legal risks of natural
hazards. Seattle lies on the Pacific Rim of Fire, subject to the
Cascadia Fault55 and the dormant, but active, volcanoes
surrounding the Puget Sound in the Cascade Mountain
Range.56 The 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens is a reminder
of the risks.57
The inability of experts to make accurate predictions
presented itself with the Mount St. Helens eruption. Experts
quickly recognized the emerging volcanic risk as its magma
bulge grew and minor earthquakes occurred, often a precursor
of an eruption. Yet, problems arose in determining how to
issue closures and warnings of the imminent threat of an
eruption. Washington State promulgated a safety zone around
Mount St. Helens prior to the eruption. The Governor relied
54. Andrew Michler, 6 Tips to Protect Your Home from Wildfires, INHABITAT (July
23, 2013), http://inhabitat.com/6-tips-to-protect-your-home-from-wildfires/.
55. See Kathryn Schulz, The Really Big One, NEW YORKER, July 20, 2015, at 52
(depicting an apocalyptic worse case analysis of the substantial potential losses from a
major earthquake and tsunami on the Cascadia Fault).
56. These include Mount Adams, Mount Baker, and Mount Rainier, and Glacier
Peak.
57. Mount St. Helens’ major eruption was on May 18, 1980. Fifty-seven died or
remained missing after the eruption. The cloud reached 80,000 feet high in less than
fifteen minutes. The streetlights turned on 250 miles away in Spokane, Washington
because of complete darkness. The landslide area covered twenty-three square miles.
1,314 feet were removed from the mountain’s summit. Steve Brantley & Bobbie Myers,
Mount St. Helens – From the 1980 Eruption to 2000, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2000/fs036-00/ (last modified Mar. 1, 2005).
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upon the experts in adopting the restricted zones
recommended by the United States Forest Service.58 Red zones
and blue zones were created.59 The inner red zone was
essentially off limits to everyone.60 The outer blue zone allowed
limited access through a permit system.61
The Washington Department of Emergency Services later
recognized that the initial zones did not reflect the changing
dynamics of the volcano. They prepared proposed revisions to
the zones. However, the volcano erupted on May 18, 1980
without warning, before the Governor could act upon the
proposed revisions. 62 Sixty people, mostly beyond the red zone,
were killed or missing in the eruption.
The eruption exceeded the red zone on one side of the
mountain, but left unscathed some of the restrictive areas on
the opposite side. Fourteen of the victims filed suit, alleging
negligent drawing of the restrictive zones. Conversely,
unscathed merchants on the other side of the mountain sued
because their community was not removed from the restricted
zone prior to the eruption.63 They sought their business losses
from the restrictions. In other words, the zones were overinclusive on one side and under-inclusive on the other, as the
volcano over erupted on one side and under-erupted on the
other. The actual eruption was ten to fifteen times greater
than the previous largest known eruption of Mount St. Helens,
and fifteen times larger than an expert’s worst prediction. 64
None of the experts accurately predicted the eruption.65
The cases were filed in state court alleging a cause of action
under Washington’s Tort Claims Act.66 The state won both
cases.67 The establishment of a restricted zone of entry around
Mount St. Helens was viewed as essential to the preservation
and maintenance of life, health, property, and the public peace.
58. Karr v. State, 53 Wash. App. 1, 4, 765 P.2d 316, 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 319–20.
63. Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n. v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 466, 647 P.2d 481 (Wash.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
64. Karr, 765 P.2d at 319.
65. Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n., 647 P.2d at 483.
66. Id. at 484; Karr, 765 P.2d at 319; See also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92 (2016).
67. Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n., 647 P.2d at 489; Karr, 765 P.2d at 321.
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The Governor made a considered policy decision in closing
areas around the mountain relying upon expert advice. 68 The
decision to establish a safety zone “requires the exercise of
basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise,”69 and while
hindsight for lawyers is the best test of foreseeability, experts
and emergency managers must make the best judgment they
can based on the state and availability of scientific knowledge
at the time.
The Mount St. Helens litigation is an example of the best
experts being unable to fully predict or control natural
hazards, such as volcanic eruptions. The authorities and
experts made the best decisions they could under the
circumstances and in light of the known science.
Mount Rainier may be a dormant volcano, but the prognosis
is grim should it awaken. The damages would greatly exceed
those of Mount St. Helens. The potential mudflows have been
mapped, with an estimated 100,000 persons living in homes
built on debris washed down the mountain by catastrophic
debris flows. 70
Washington State’s second extreme weather experience is
the flooding of the Paradise Visitors Center and the area
around Mount Rainier during the November 2006 Flood.
Eighteen inches of rain fell on the mountain in thirty-six hours
on November 6–7, 2006,71 unleashing torrents of water down
the mountain’s slopes. Campgrounds, roads, trails, and
utilities were washed out. Rainier National Park was closed for
six months to repair the damages.72 Even the great dams on
the Columbia River and its tributaries cannot prevent flooding
in extreme precipitation. For example, the Columbia River rose
above flood stage in May 2011.73
68. Karr, 765 P.2d at 319.
69. Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n., 647 P.2d at 484.
70. Jon Krakauer, Geologists Worry About Danger of Living “Under the Volcano”,
SMITHSONIAN MAG., July 1996, at 33–34.
71. Press Release, National Park Service, Mount Rainier National Park, November
2006 Flood, https://www.nps.gov/mora/learn/news/november-2006-flooding.htm (last
visited May 5, 2017).
72. MOUNT RAINIER NATIONAL PARK FLOOD OBSERVER, NOVEMBER 2006 FLOOD
MAKES HISTORY (2007).
73. Mark Bowder, Columbia River Rises Above Flood Stage in Vancouver: Limited
Flooding
Expected;
Expect
More
Bridge
Lifts
(May
27,
2011),
http://www.columbian.com/news/2011/may/28/columbia-river-rises-above-flood-stagevancouver/. See also Seattle Times Staff, Forecast: Worst of Columbia River Flooding
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A third experience is the Oso Landslide that buried Oso,
Washington on March 22, 2014, killing forty-three residents. 74
The landslide was on a known dangerous slide area, but the
County failed to warn the residents of the area of this risk,75
which remains subject to landslide risks. 76 In litigation, a legal
argument was made that the state failed to warn the citizens
that they were at risk from the landslide. The Washington
Supreme Court earlier held that the state had a duty to
disclose avalanche dangers,77 since these avalanche and
landslide risks are often known and mapped. The potential
danger zone is highly predictable based on prior slides and
geologic studies, unlike volcanic eruption zones.78 The state
settled the Oso Landslide case for $50 million, and a private
defendant settled for $10 million.79
Liability was reached in the Oso Landslide because the risks
were known to the state, the residents could have been
warned, and the disaster avoided.80 The volcanic eruption of
Mount St. Helens was different. There, only general
Over, SEATTLE TIMES (June 25, 2011 3:47 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/forecast-worst-of-columbia-river-flooding-over-1/.
74. Jessica Robertson, One Year Later—The Oso Landslide in Washington, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY
(Mar.
16,
2016,
12:55
PM),
https://www2.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs_top_story/one-year-later-the-oso-landslidein-washington/.
75. See Jim Brunner et al., County Mudslide Warnings Failed to Reach Hill’s
Residents,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Apr.
26,
2004),
http://old.seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2023468682_mudslidenotificationxml.html.
See also David Montgomery, Guest: Map the Runoff Risk for Landslides Like Oso,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Apr.
14,
2014),
http://old.seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2023376128_davidmontgomeryopedosolandsli
dexxxml.html; Warren Cornwall, Causes of Deadly Washington Mudslide Revealed in
Scientific
Report,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(July
24,
2014),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/07/140722-oso-washington-mudslidescience-logging/.
76. Sean R. LaHusen, et al., Surface Roughness Dating of Long-runout Landslides
Near Oso, Washington (USA), Reveals Persistent Postglacial Hillslope Instability, 44
GEOLOGY
111,
113
(2015),
http://geology.gsapubs.org/content/early/2015/12/22/G37267.1.full.pdf.
77. Brown v. MacPherson’s, 545 P.2d 13, 19 (Wash. 1975).
78. Avalanche
Control,
WASH.
ST.
DEP’T.
TRANSP.,
http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/maintenance/avalanche (last visited June 16, 2017).
79. Mike Carter, ‘This must never happen again’: Oso landslide survivors reach
settlements
totaling
$60
million,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Oct.
10,
2016),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/timber-company-reaches-10m-settlement-inoso-landslide-suit/.
80. Id.
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foreseeability existed; the state made the best judgment
available in light of the advice of the experts, dealing with an
eruption which turned out to exceed all predictions.81
B.

The Mississippi River and New Orleans: A Sisyphean
Exercise in Flood Control

The Mighty Mississippi is a prime example of the best
engineering and levees restraining what might be called
“normal” floods but unsuccessful in controlling extreme
flooding. New Orleans was settled in 1718 by the French;
occupants from then on have battled the elements.
The hubris of Americans was exemplified by the Chief of
Engineers of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in
1926. He wrote, after surveying the massive levee system
lining the Mississippi, the Mighty Mississippi could be
controlled to prevent the “destructive effects of floods.”82
Mark Twain, a former Mississippi River pilot, held the
opposite view in the nineteenth century:
One who knows the Mississippi will promptly aver—
not aloud, but to himself—that 10,000 river
commissions, with the mines of the world at their back,
cannot tame that lawless stream, cannot curb it or
confine it, cannot say to it, Go here or Go there, and
make it obey; cannot save a shore which it has
sentenced.83
The Mighty Mississippi quickly validated Mark Twain with
the historic Great Flood of 1927, which inundated 16,570,627
acres over 170 counties in seven states.84 Over 162,000 homes
were flooded and 41,487 buildings destroyed.85 Fatalities range
between 250 and 500 persons.86
The 1927 flood was not an anomaly. The Great Flood of 1993

81. Veronica Jennings, Mt. St. Helens Dispute Erupts Into Lawsuit, WASH. POST
(July 25, 1981), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/realestate/1981/07/25/mt-sthelens-dispute-erupts-into-lawsuit/a56d7cde-7edf-4951-9a84-fa89dd76716a/.
82. Pete Daniel, DEEP’N AS IT COMES: THE 1927 MISSISSIPPI FLOOD 6 (1976) (quoting
the annual report).
83. Mark Twain, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 172–73 (Signet Classics ed., 1963).
84. Daniel, supra note 82 at 8. See also John M. Barry, Rising Tide: The Great
Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America (1997).
85. Daniel, supra note 82 at 8.
86. Id.
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covered eight months and impacted nine states.87 An estimated
54,000 persons were evacuated and over 50,000 homes
damaged or destroyed.88 The high-water mark of the
Mississippi at St. Louis reached a record forty-nine to fiftyeight feet.89 The excessive precipitation caused the largest
flood ever measured in St. Louis.90 Five towns were completely
inundated with Hannibal, Louisiana, and Clarksville, Missouri
under water for 153 consecutive days.91 Over twenty million
acres of land were inundated in the nine states.92 The sixmonth flood period was caused by a previous wet fall with
saturated soils, normal to above normal snow accumulation in
winter, rapid spring snowmelt, and heavy thunder storms.93
The flooding risks on the Mississippi differ between the
Upper Mississippi and the Lower Mississippi because the
Lower Mississippi is wider and deeper with a greater carrying
capacity than the upper Mississippi.94 The Army Corps of
Engineers has further reduced the flood risks to the New
Orleans area from upstream through diversion facilities. Thus,
the flood waters tend to have a lesser impact on the Louisiana
segments of the River. The bypass facilities are first above
New Orleans through the Morganza Spillway into the
Atchafalaya and thence into the Gulf, and second through the
Bonnet Carre into Lake Pontchartrain. Severe flood waters are
thereby diverted away from New Orleans to other areas in
Louisiana.95
87. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE GREAT FLOOD OF 1993 x (1994).
88. Id. at xvii.
89. Id. at 1-1. The Mississippi River was expected to crest at 39.4 feet on the St.
Louis riverfront in April 2013, roughly nine feet above flood stage. Mississippi River to
Crest Above Flood Stage, Locks to Close, CBS ST. LOUIS (Apr. 19, 2013),
http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2013/04/19/mississippi-river-to-crest-above-flood-stage-locksto-close/.
90. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-95-125, MIDWEST FLOOD:
INFORMATION ON THE PERFORMANCE, EFFECTS, AND CONTROL OF LEVEES 2 (1995).
91. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 81, at 1–3.
92. Id. at 1–4.
93. Id. at 1–2.
94. Suzanne Fournier, spokeswoman for the Army Corps of Engineers, said “South of
St. Louis, the Mississippi is much wider and deeper, minimizing the impact of the
flooding upstream.” William Branigin, St. Louis Levees Are Expected to Hold
Mississippi, WASH. POST (June 21, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/06/20/ST2008062002918.html.
95. JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 6, 9 (1989); Mark Guarino, Morganza
Spillway: Flooding Farmland to Save New Orleans, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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The un-channeled Mississippi River in its natural state is an
example of natural forces constantly changing the natural
environment. The potential always exists for the river to
overwhelm human defenses. The Mississippi River, pursuant
to its wandering history, wants to bypass Baton Rouge, New
Orleans and the industrial complex along the current banks of
the Mississippi, and follow the Atchafalaya to the Gulf, west of
New Orleans.96 The Army Corps of Engineers manages a river
control system, which funnels 70 percent of the Mississippi
through its current course to New Orleans and 30 percent to
the Atchafalaya. 97
The main flooding risk in New Orleans comes from
hurricanes blowing up the Mississippi River and Lake
Pontchartrain,98 and overflowing the levees, as occurred with
Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans has been struck nine times
before Katrina, including the major hurricanes of Betsy in
196599 and Camille in 1969.100 It is highly foreseeable that New
Orleans will be struck again, many times. A prescient expert’s
worst case scenario was that New Orleans could become a
twenty foot’ deep lake. The storm surge would enter Lake
Pontchartrain, overflow the levees, and pour into the city. The

(May
15,
2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0515/Morganza-spillwayFlooding-framland-to-save-New-Orleans.
96. Alexis C. Madrigal, What We’ve Done to the Mississippi River: An Explainer, THE
ATLANTIC
(May
19,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/05/what-weve-done-to-themississippi-river-an-explainer/239058/.
97. MCPHEE, supra 95 at 10–11.
98. Lake Pontchartrain is a 640-square mile tidal basin coming off the Gulf of
Mexico. It is connected to the Gulf through Lake Borgne and the Mississippi Sound.
99. Hurricane Betsy struck Grand Isle, Louisiana on September 9, 1965 and moved
up the Mississippi River. The Mississippi level rose ten feet by New Orleans. It
breached the levees on the Industrial Canal in New Orleans. About 164,000 homes
were flooded. Seventy-six deaths resulted from the hurricane and an estimated $1.42
billion in damages resulted. As a result of Hurricane Betsy, the Army Corps of
Engineers designed the Hurricane Protection Program with the intent of protecting
New Orleans from a Category 3 hurricane. 1965 - Hurricane Betsy, HURRICANES:
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, http://www.hurricanescience.org/history/storms/1960s/betsy/
(last visited May 29, 2017).
100. Hurricane Camille struck the Gulf Coast on August 17, 1969. It flooded
860,000 acres in Louisiana and “forced the Mississippi river to flow backwards from its
mouth in Venice, LA to a point north of New Orleans . . . .” 1969 - Hurricane Camille,
HURRICANES:
SCIENCE
AND
SOCIETY,
http://www.hurricanescience.org/history/storms/1960s/camille/.
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surviving levees would trap the flood water within the city. 101
Much of that scenario transpired with Hurricane Katrina.
The weakened levees failed during Katrina. Over 8 percent
of New Orleans and much of the surrounding area was
flooded.102 Several postmortem studies were undertaken to
determine the causes of the disaster. A Corps of Engineers
Study found “[t]he storm exceeded design criteria, but the
performance was less than the design intent.”103 Fifty levees
failed, forty-six of which were caused by overtopping 104 and
erosion, and four by foundation failures.105
The overtopping of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal
(IHNC) exceeded design levels. The structure had shrunk by
two feet over thirty-five years, illustrating the shrinking
nature of the ground in the New Orleans area.106 The flooding
was compounded because many of the pumping stations were
not designed with the capacity to handle large storms.107
Earlier hurricanes exposed the vulnerability of New
Orleans.108 A Category 4 hurricane struck New Orleans in
1915. A fifteen to twenty foot storm surge swept up the
Mississippi, overwhelming the levees. Lake Pontchartrain rose
six feet over sea level, overtopping its embankments.109
A Category 3 hurricane in 1947 also overwhelmed defenses

101. Francis F. Marcus, Storm Adds Reality to New Orleans Drill, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 1995, at 18.
102. Ann Zimmerman, Hurricane Katrina: Facts, Damage & Aftermath, LIVE
SCIENCE (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.livescience.com/22522-hurricane-katrinafacts.html.
103. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF NEW ORLEANS AND
SOUTHERN LOUISIANA HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF
THE INTERAGENCY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TASK FORCE at I-3 (2006).
THE

104. Overtopping is the phenomenon whereby water, usually flood water, will flow
over the top of the dam, levee, or other embankment. If, for example, the dam is fifteen
feet high, and the river level reaches sixteen feet, it will overtop the dam. The design
limits of the dam would have been exceeded.
105. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 103 at I-7.
106. Id. at I-4.
107. Id. at I-5–I-6.
108. For a history of New Orleans hurricanes, see Stephen A. Nelson, Why New
Orleans is Vulnerable to Hurricanes: Geologic and Historical Factors, TIDE-1220
TULANE
UNIVERSITY
(Dec.
10,
2012),
http://www.tulane.edu/~sanelson/New_Orleans_and_Hurricanes/New_Orleans_Vulner
ability.htm.
109. Patricia Grossi & Robert Muir-Wood, Flood Risk in New Orleans: Implications
for Future Management and Insurability 4 (Risk Management Solutions, Inc. 2006).
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along Lake Pontchartrain and the western wall of the 17th
Street Canal. Flooding engulfed thirty square miles of
Jefferson County and nine square miles of Orleans Parish. 110
Hurricane Betsy in 1965 was very damaging to the city. The
eastern part of the city was flooded when the Industrial
Canal’s embankments failed. The storm surge was twelve feet
above sea level.111 The 17th Street and Industrial Canals also
failed during Hurricane Katrina.
The Corps has rebuilt the levee system protecting the
greater New Orleans area, but design limits will only protect
to a 100-year storm hurricane.112 Katrina started as a Category
5 hurricane and downsized to a Category 3 when it struck New
Orleans. Thus, a high probability exists that New Orleans will
again fall victim to a major hurricane despite the rebuilt
levees.
Both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were Category 5
hurricanes during their life. The Great Miami Hurricane of
1926 was a Category 4 when it struck downtown Miami.
Similarly, Hurricane Hugo was also a category 4 when it hit
Charleston. Camille was a Category 5 when it reached the
Mississippi Coast on August 17, 1969.
The Mississippi remains untamable by humans.
C.

Southern California: An Environment of Extreme Natural
Hazards

California is known for its seismic risks, but it is also subject
to recurring periods of extreme weather, ranging from drought
to flooding.113 A normal cycle is heavy rains, followed by

110. Id.
111. Id. at 5.
112. See Mark Schleifstein, New Orleans Area’s Upgraded Levees Not Enough for
Next ‘Katrina,’ Engineers Say, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (August 18, 2015, 1:18 PM),
http://www.nola.com/futureofneworleans/2015/08/new_levees_inadequate_for_next.ht
ml. A 100 year flood event is that on average a flood of this magnitude will occur once
in 100 years. Since it is an average, the 100 year event could occur more than once in a
century or skip a century.
113. See B. LYNN INGRAM & FRANCES MALAMUD-ROAM, Foreword to THE WEST
WITHOUT WATER: WHAT VAST FLOODS, DROUGHTS, AND OTHER CLIMATIC CLUES TELL
US ABOUT TOMORROW at xiii–xiv (2013) (ebook). I remember growing up in San
Francisco periodically hearing of recurrent flooding in Guerneville on the Russian
River in Sonoma County and Topanga Canyon near Malibu. Documented flooding in
Guerneville occurred in 1940, 1943, 1955, 1958, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1974,
1978, 1983, 1986, 1995 (twice), 1997, and 2006. See Current River Information,
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flooding, and then drought and wildfires.114 Few are aware of
the history of major flooding in Southern California. The Santa
Ana River is only ninety-six miles long, but it is the longest
river in Southern California. 115 It drains a watershed of 2,650
square miles in Los Angeles County, Riverside County, San
Bernardino County, and Orange County from whence it flows
into the Pacific Ocean. It was also labeled by the Army Corps
of Engineers as the greatest flood hazard west of the
Mississippi after the Flood of 1938.116
The March 3, 1938 Flood followed days of heavy rain. Sixtyeight thousand acres were flooded in the county with much of
Anaheim and the city of Orange under four feet of water. Even
more destructive was the peak flow of an earlier flood in 1862,
which was measured at 320,000 cfs.117
The state of California earlier suffered a mammoth flooding
in 1861–1862, when a series of storms struck the West Coast.
Sixty-six inches of rain fell in Los Angeles.118 Thirty-five inches
fell from December 24, 1861 to January 23, 1862 alone.119
Much of Orange County was submerged. The Santa Ana River
by Anaheim overflowed four miles out of its banks, four miles
RUSSIAN
RIVER
HISTORICAL
SOCIETY,
http://www.russianriverhistory.org/about/river_info.html (last visited May 29, 2017).
Topanga Canyon experienced major flooding in 1938, 1969, 1978, 1980, and 1983.
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING, TOPANGA ENVIRONMENTAL CORRIDOR STUDY
19,
http://rcdsmm.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/Topanga-Corridor-StudyCaltrans.pdf.
114. The rains come, promoting new growth of vegetation, but also causing flooding,
erosion, and landslides. The rains cease, and years of drought set in. The lush
vegetation turns into dry vegetation. Something causes a wildfire, which spreads
quickly through the dry tinder box, often aided by winds. The fires leave the land bare,
facilitating heavy flooding and erosion when the rains return.
115. Nathan Masters, The Santa Ana River: How It Shaped Orange County,
KCETLINK (Nov. 12, 2012), https://www.kcet.org/shows/lost-la/the-santa-ana-riverhow-it-shaped-orange-county.
116. Scott Gold, 1938 Flood: A Watershed for the County: Disaster Prompted $1.3
Billion Effort to Tame Santa Ana River, Protect Basin, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/oct/03/local/me-18228.
117. Nita Hiltner, Santa Ana River Was West’s Greatest Flood Hazard, PRESS
ENTERPRISE, http://www.pe.com/articls/flood-616015-river-santa.html. Cubic feet per
second (cfs) is a standard measurement of water flow, measured as one cubic foot of
water per second.
118. B. Lynn Ingram, California Megaflood: Lessons From a Forgotten Catastrophe,
SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN
(Jan.
1,
2013),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atmospheric-rivers-california-megafloodlessons-from-forgotten-catastrophe/.
119. Ingram, supra note 113 at 28.
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to the side of the river, and lasted four weeks.120 The Central
Valley was a lake up to thirty feet deep in water. 121
Sacramento was submerged under ten feet of water.122
Northern Mexico, Oregon, Washington, British Columbia,
Arizona, Nevada, and Utah were also subject to severe
flooding. 123
A series of dams and channelization have controlled the
Santa Ana’s streamflow, as they have on the neighboring Los
Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers. Otherwise much of the Los
Angeles Plain would be periodically uninhabitable. The Prado
Dam, built in 1941, and the Seven Oaks Dam, constructed in
1999, coupled with cement channelization of portions of the
Santa Ana riverbed have contained the river in recent years,
but both dams have design limits. For example, the Seven
Oaks Dam is designed for a 350-year flood.124 The 1862 Flood
was viewed as a 1,000-year flood.125
California remains at risk for mega-storms in the form of
“atmospheric rivers”, unleashing heavy flooding on a 200-year
basis. The dams, levees, and channels will not control or
contain the precipitation. 126
The eight counties south of the Tehachapi Mountains are an
example of humans tempering, but not controlling, nature. The
Los Angeles basin is ringed by the Pacific Ocean and a chain of
mountains, most notably the Hollywood Hills, the San Gabriel
Mountains, the Santa Ana Mountains, the Verdugos, and the
Santa Monica Mountains.127 The hills are subject to wildfires,
landslides, and flash flooding.
Vicious stream flows emerge from the mountains during
heavy rains. The risk remains of flooding, landslides, and
avalanches at the foothills of the mountains. A major flood
overwhelming the dam system might still strike the Los
120. Id.
121. Id. at 31.
122. Id. at 33.
123. Id. at 37–38.
124. Hiltner, supra note 117.
125. Id.
126. See Dettinger & Ingram, supra note 50.
127. The mountains trapping the polluted local air, mostly from automobile
exhausts, is the reason for the smog inversions in the Los Angeles basin. For a history
of Southern California smog, see C HIP JACOBS & WILLIAM J. KELLY, SMOGTOWN: THE
LUNG-BURNING HISTORY IN LOS ANGELES (2008).
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Angeles plain. John McPhee in his classic book, The Control of
Nature,128 wrote that the public built “debris basins” in
downstream areas to catch the debris, including “rivers of
boulders” coming out of the San Gabriel Mountains during
heavy rainfalls.129
IV. RISK REDUCTION MEASURES
We can temper many of the forces of nature, but can never
tame nature. We can, for example, stop most flooding (though
not in cases of extreme precipitation). To the extent that we
cannot control the forces of nature, we need to prepare in
advance to reduce the impacts. Earthquakes, hurricanes,
tornadoes, and tsunamis will not be deterred by our acts, but
the damage and impact can be reduced through several
actions. Humans are not helpless against even extreme acts of
nature. The purpose of this article is not to list every risk
reduction or mitigation measure, natural hazard by natural
hazard. Instead, it lays out a few general principles and
problems. For example, even if we cannot stop development in
risky areas, the risks can be moderated by effective and
enforced building codes, professional standards, and statutes.
Four general categories can reduce the risk to people:
Development Bans or Restrictions
Design Standards
Warning Systems
The Response Effort: Emergency Action Plans
Limitations on these measures are the Fifth Amendment
and human nature.
A.

Development Bans or Restrictions

One solution to minimizing the risks from natural hazards
would be to avoid living in areas subject to extreme risks, such
as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New Orleans or Seattle. A
“natural” disaster may involve forces of nature, but the tragedy
may be of human origin in geologically fragile areas with a
high population density.130 The thesis is that humans create
128. JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 191–97 (1989).
129. Id. at 192.
130. See Denis Binder, The Duty to Disclose Geologic Hazards in Real Estate
Transactions, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 13, 45 (1998).
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the risk by moving into the natural hazard. Humans turn the
forces of nature into disasters.131
This thesis was advanced by the famous philosopher
Rousseau after the Great Lisbon Earthquake of November 1,
1755. The earthquake, estimated to be an 8.5 on the Richter
scale,132 was followed by a fire and tsunami.133 Much of the city
was destroyed by this horrific trifecta of perils. An estimated
60,000 people perished in the disaster.134 Most of the city’s
churches were destroyed on All Saints Day, giving rise to the
claim that the earthquake was an act of God.135
131. In this respect, the term “natural disaster” can be viewed as an oxymoron.
132. MARK MOLESKY, THIS GULF OF FIRE: THE DESTRUCTION OF LISBON OR
APOCALYPSE IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE AND REASON 6–7 (2015). It is estimated to be 8.5–
9.1 on the Mw scale (local magnitude scale) rather than the Richter Scale. The
earthquake zone covered 5.8 million miles. Tremors were felt not only in Portugal, but
also in Sweden, Norway, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Sardinia, Greenland,
Cape Verde, the Azores, England, and Venice. Id. at 111–15. It was especially
damaging in Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa. Id. at 18–19. A tsunami hit Lisbon
one-half hour after the earthquake. It also struck Spain, Morocco, Northeast Brazil,
the West Indies, and Newfoundland. Waves reached Brittany, France, Brest,
Cornwall, and Plymouth. Id. at 143–44. See also EDWARD PAICE, WRATH OF GOD: THE
GREAT LISBON EARTHQUAKE OF 1755 (2008) and NICHOLAS SHADY, THE LAST DAY:
WRATH, RUIN & REASON IN THE GREAT LISBON EARTHQUAKE OF 1755 (2009).
133. History demonstrates that large earthquakes or tsunamis are often followed by
great fires. Two examples are the Great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 and the San
Francisco Earthquake and Fire of April 18–21, 1906. The 7.8 magnitude earthquake
struck San Francisco on April 18, 1906, destroying many buildings in the central
downtown area of the city. The earthquake was followed by four days of fire. Over 500
blocks in were leveled. Over 28,000 buildings were destroyed in the inferno. The
estimated fatalities exceeded 3,000 with about 250,000 rendered homeless. San
Francisco Earthquake of 1906, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 16, 2017),
https://www.britannica.com/event/San-Francisco-earthquake-of-1906. The earthquake
razed only 2 percent of the buildings with the fires destroying the other 98 percent.
The San Francisco Earthquake of 1906: An Insurance Perspective, INS.E. INST.,
http://www.iii.org/article/san-francisco-earthquake-1906-insurance-perspective
(last
visited June 16, 2016).
134. Marc-Andre Gutscher, What Caused the Great Lisbon Earthquake?, 35 SCI .
5688, 1247 (2004). The earthquake damaged cities in Morocco with substantial loss of
life in Algeria and Morocco and the tsunami reached Ireland, Cornwall in England and
the Caribbean. 1755 The Great Lisbon Earthquake and Tsunami, Portugal, SMS
TSUNAMI WARNING, http://www.sms-tsunami-warning.com/pages/tsunami-portugal1755 (last visited May 30, 2017).
135. For a deconstruction of the act of God defense in Tort Law, see Denis Binder,
Act of God? Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort Law, 15 REV.
LITIG. 1 (1996). The Great Lisbon Earthquake is often viewed as the “First Modern
Earthquake” because it led to the first study of seismology and building codes.
Professor Villa in his companion piece in this symposium posits a role for the Act of
God to continue to play in environmental disasters, Clifford J. Villa, Is the “Act of God”
Dead?, 7 WASH. J. ENVTL. LAW AND POL’Y __ (forthcoming July 2017).
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Rousseau wrote to Voltaire “that it was hardly nature who
assembled twenty-thousand houses of six or seven stories. If
the residents of this large city had been more evenly dispersed
and less densely housed, the losses would have been fewer or
perhaps none at all.”136
The seemingly simple solution would therefore be to live in
areas risk free from geological or meteorological risks. This
approach is untenable. Three hundred and twenty-four million
Americans must live somewhere as do seven billion people
globally.137 A hazards map of the United States looking at
seismic, volcanic, hurricane, tornado, flooding, and wildfire
threats will show basically no safe zone.138 People often
continue to live in geologically and meteorologically unsafe
areas because they have no viable alternative.
Most disaster losses are perforce on built environments. For
example, an earthquake in the barren desert will not cause the
same losses in human lives, property damages, and economic
losses as a similar seismic event in a large metropolitan
area.139 So too with hurricanes striking a deserted coast rather

The act of God defense has been refined over the past century to have two elements:
1) an unforeseeable event; and 2) the absence of human fault in causing the damages.
Thus, if an act of God coalesces with a human act, then the defense fails. Binder at 17–
18. For example, excessive precipitation may be an act of God, but building in
floodplains and filling wetlands are acts of humans.
If an event has happened before, then it is foreseeable that it will happen again. A
disaster may be the result of an uncontrollable natural cause, but it is not
unforeseeable if it occurred before. The test then becomes what should the reasonable
person, or expert, do in light of that knowledge. The act of God defense thereby fails.
136. Letter from Jean Jacques Rousseau to Voltaire, (Aug. 18, 1756),
CORRESPONDENCE COMPLÈTE DE JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, J.A. Leigh, ed., vol. 4
(Geneva, 1967); translated by R. Sprang. The phrase is written in French, and
different translations into English have slightly different wording, but the meaning
remains the same.
137. The Census Bureau estimated the United States population on January 1, 2017
to be 324,310,011 and the world’s 7,362,350,168. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau,
Census Bureau Projects U.S. and World Populations on New Year’s Day (Dec. 28,
2016),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-tps158.html.
A
tragic example of people living in hazardous conditions is Bangladesh where 35–77
million drink arsenic contaminated drinking water. Allen H. Smith et al,
Contamination of Drinking Water in Bangladesh: A Public Health Emergency, 78
BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 9, 1093 (2000).
138. See supra notes 13–32 and accompanying text.
139. An earthquake of 7.0 magnitude knocked an Amtrak train off its tracks with
four passengers injured. The epicenter of the earthquake was in the Mojave Desert by
the Twentynine Palms Marine Base. The earthquake was felt in Las Vegas and Los
Angeles. About 250,000 temporarily lost power, but no major damage ensued. Tom
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than a coastal city.140 The larger the population, the greater
the potential disaster.141 Therefore, areas subject to severe
natural risks are often densely populated with the risks of
nature compounded by the human built environment.
One measure to reduce risk is to ban development in areas
subject to extreme natural hazards. That approach, though,
may run afoul of the Takings Clause and thus encounters
constitutional barriers. The Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause142 can serve as a restraint on public officials seeking to
restrict development in perilous areas. Justice Black in his
majority opinion in Armstrong v. United States143 wrote the
purpose of the Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens, which
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”144 This right is not absolute.
The conundrum arises in that the government can exercise
the “police power” to protect the public.145 The government can
thereby engage in reasonable regulations to protect the public.
The police power includes “everything essential to the public
safety, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or
abatement . . . of whatever may be regarded as a public

Gorman and Mitchell Landsberg, 7.0 Earthquake in Mojave Desert Rocks Southland,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/oct/17/news/mn23272.
140. Fourteen of the twenty largest cities in the United States and 670 of the
nation’s 3,111 counties lie in the coastal zone. THE JOHN H. HEINZ III CENTER FOR
SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS
19, 24 (2002).
141. The devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York is an
example of a hurricane striking a high populated area with little hurricane protection.
The hurricane struck a 600-mile-wide stretch of the East Coast, especially damaging
New Jersey and New York, on October 29, 2012 during a full moon. Fourteen feet
waves struck Battery Park in Manhattan. Parts of the New York City subway system
was flooded. Over 650,000 homes were destroyed or damaged. Eighty Percent of
Atlantic City was under water. An eight and a half foot storm surge struck Sandy
Hook, New Jersey. Estimated damages exceeded $50 billion, including $19 billion in
New York City. Kimberly Amadeo, What Are the Facts About Sandy’s Damage and
Economic Impact?, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-sandy-facts3305501.
142. The Fifth Amendment provides “[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend V.
143. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
144. Id. at 49.
145. The classic standard “police power” is in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894).
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nuisance.”146 The government can also destroy property under
this power.147
The problem is drawing a line between a reasonable
regulation and a taking. A definitive interpretation of the
takings issue has defied jurists and commentators. Thus,
Justice Brennen acknowledged in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,148 “[T]his Court, quite simply, has been
unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when
‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than
disproportionately concentrated in a few persons.”149
Unsurprisingly, past attempts to restrict development in
floodplains have been unsuccessful, absent acquiring the
land.150
Attempts to restrict development in floodplains and along
the coastal zone have met Constitutional resistance under the
Takings Clause. The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission 151 struck down a total ban on
construction or reconstruction of a destroyed building in a
coastal zone conservancy zone. Dolan v. City of Tigard 152
invalidated the forced dedication of private property as a
public greenway within a floodplain. A total deprivation of use,
as in Lucas, is highly suspect. Forced entry is also highly
suspect, as in Dolan, because of the historic property right of
an owner to exclude others.153
146. Id. at 136.
147. Id.
148. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
149. Id. at 124.
150. State courts split prior to the enactment of NEPA, which occurred on Earth Day
April 17, 1969, on the constitutionality of restricting wetlands and floodplains
developments. See, e.g., Iowa Nat’l Res. Council v. Van Zee, 158 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa
1968) (upholding restrictions), Comm’r Nat’l Res. v. S. Volpe & Co., Inc., 206 N.E.2d
666 (Mass. 1965) (same), Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1953) (denying constitutionality of restrictions), Morris
Cty. Land Improvement Co. v. Twp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963)
(denied), Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm’n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964) (same),
Hofkin v. Whitemarsh, 42 Pa. D. & C. 2d 417 (1967) (same). Later cases generally
went up to the United Sates Supreme Court under the Takings Clause. But see Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
151. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
152. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
153. One of the most important sticks in the bundle of sticks is the right to exclude.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
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An alternative, though, is for the government to acquire
lands, such as those subject to periodic flooding. One way to
accomplish that task is through conservation easements.154
B.

Design Limits as a Constraint on Eliminating Natural
Risks

Society responds to disasters by enacting safety codes, such
as building standards, fire codes, and health and safety
requirements. In addition, professional groups promulgate
professional standards.155
These pre-incident building standards, building codes, fire
codes, health and safety codes, and professional standards can
minimize the impact of extreme hazards. Emergency action
and business continuity plans can affect response and
recovery. Public officials may be trained and tested in
emergency responses.
These measures are standard restrictions in the United
States to minimize natural hazards. They can be effective in
reducing many risks, but may have limits when it comes to
extreme natural hazards.
Both natural objects, such as rivers, and human
developments have design limits. If a river exceeds its carrying
capacity, then flooding occurs. The effectiveness of any
preventative, redundancy, resiliency, or response measure is
dependent upon its design limits. For example, a bridge
designed to resist a twenty-five-year-flood could wash away in
a forty-two to fifty-five year-flood.156
Every facility and structure has design limits which does not
usually, and perhaps cannot, protect against extreme
geological or meteorological risks. Structures, such as bridges,
canals, channels, dams, highways, skyscrapers, and tunnels,

154. See, e.g., Zachary A. Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The
Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119
(2010).
155. For example, the National Fire Protection Agency published a wide array of
professional standards, including emergency responses. See NFPA 1600: Standard on
Disaster/Emergency management and Business Continuity Plans, NAT’L. FIRE
PROTEC. ASS’N. (2016).
156. See Wright v. United States, 568 F.2d 153, 156 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 824 (1978). The twenty-five-year flood is one expected to occur once every
twenty-five years on average. The forty-two to fifty-five-year flood event would thus be
expected to roughly occur twice in a century.
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are necessary for civilization to survive and minimize natural
risks. All, though, have design limits; they will provide little
protection against a force of nature that exceeds those limits.
Design limits are based on many factors, including
foreseeable risks, legal requirements, professional codes and
standards, costs, cost/benefit and risk/benefit analysis, and
available technology. Problems can also exist with improper
designs and shoddy construction.
A clear example of design tradeoffs is the levee system. The
most severe hurricanes are classified at Category 5. The
rebuilt levee system around New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina is only for a 100-year storm hurricane.157
Cost and utility are important tradeoffs in designs. We
intuitively understand that a small, economical car will
probably be less safe in an accident than a large SUV, but the
tradeoffs include increased fuel economy and affordability. The
drive for absolute safety can render the end product
uneconomical.
Design limits are, in turn, dependent upon the quality of the
design, construction, modifications, maintenance, operations,
inspections, and improvements. The Fukushima disaster is an
example of an original design meeting the safety standards at
the time of construction, but a failure to upgrade as changes in
risk awareness and technology improvements arise.
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s Fukushima
Nuclear Complex of six reactors experienced a catastrophic
meltdown on March 22, 2011. Three of the six reactors were
down for maintenance when the Great East Japan Earthquake
with a magnitude 9.0 struck Japan. The reactors’ emergency
program performed as planned with the three active reactors
automatically shutting down.158

157. See Schleifstein, supra note 112. The classification system for hurricanes and
the 100 year flood do not correlate. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale
measures the wind velocity of the storm. A Category 3 storm has winds between 111
mph and 129 mph, a Category 4 has winds between 130 mph to 156 mph, and a
Category 5 has winds over 157 mph., Categorizing Hurricanes: The Saffir-Simpson
Scale, ACCUWEATHER (June 16, 2017), http://www.accuweather.com/en/weatherglossary/what-is-the-saffirsimpson-hurr/13895047. A 100 year storm is a flood that has
a 1 percent chance of occurring in any one year. Andrea Thompson, What Is a 100-Year
Storm, LIVE SCI., (Sept. 22, 2009), https://www.livescience.com/5751-100-yearstorm.html. The storm surge of a hurricane, and thus its flood potential, is not
necessarily a factor of its wind speed. Id.
158. Fukushima Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, (Apr. 2017), http://www.world-
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However, a tsunami of thirteen to fifteen meters high struck
fifty minutes later. It swept over the complex’s ten-meter-high
seawall, destroying the emergency generators cooling the six
reactors. Both the earthquake and tsunami were of epic
proportions.
The fault lay with TEPCO. The nuclear complex met the
safety standards at the time they were constructed. TEPCO,
however, later received warnings that they were inadequate in
light of the foreseeable risks. TEPCO failed to make
improvements in light of these warnings.159 Thus, it was
unprepared for a foreseeable event.160 TEPCO subsequently
admitted fault.161
Design limits are also based on the state of the art—what
the professionals reasonably believed at the time. Knowledge
and technology change over time. Gains in technology are often
based upon learning from one’s mistakes.
Professor Henry Petroski’s book, To Engineer is Human,162
provides a fascinating look at how civil engineering has
advanced through the ages upon its mistakes. Katrina is the
greatest human caused engineering disaster in American
history. A post-Katrina assessment of the disaster concluded
that while the storm exceeded design levels, the structures did
not perform as designed.163
A tradeoff will often exist between safety and utilization.
Only eight mobile homes out of roughly 1,300 survived
Hurricane Andrew in Homestead, Florida in 1980. The federal
government weighed tightening the mobile home wind safety

nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushimaaccident.aspx.
159. Neither TEPCO nor the government regulators took or required action in light
of the revised risks. Id.
160. One result of the inaction is that the former president and two vice presidents
of TEPCO were indicted on manslaughter charges.
161. TEPCO admitted it had made no safety improvements since 2002 even though
it knew they were needed. Their 5.7 meter high seawall was insufficient to restrain the
fourteen meter high tsunami. Justin McCurry, Fukushima Disaster Could Have Been
Avoided, Nuclear Plant Operator Admits, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/oct/15/fukushima-disaster-avoidednuclear-plant.
162. Henry Petroski, TO ENGINEER IS HUMAN: THE ROLE OF FAILURE IN SUCCESSFUL
DESIGN (1982). “[T]he history of structural engineering, indeed the history of
engineering in general, may be told in its failures as well as in it triumphs.” Id. at 9.
163. See Marcus, supra note 101.

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017

31

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

2017]

THE NATURE OF EXTREME NATURAL RISKS

371

standards.164 A spokesman for the United States Department
of Housing & Urban Development recognized that the issue
required: “[t]he classic balancing act . . . . [w]e could make
these homes completely safe and solid—so much so that they’d
be out of reach for lower-income consumers.”165
The limits appear in attempting to minimize risks, as shown
by a tornado that struck Moore, Oklahoma on May 20, 2013.
Twenty-four deaths occurred, including seven school children
when the tornado struck their elementary school. The school
lacked a tornado shelter.166 Discussions ensued after the
tragedy about putting tornado shelters in schools. 167 The
problem with many buildings is retrofitting an existing
structure. The costs and technological challenges make
retrofitting unfeasible in many instances.
However, design criteria are irrelevant if the actual design
is flawed or negligence exists in the construction and
implementation of the design, operations, or maintenance. For
example, the Teton Dam in Idaho failed on June 9, 1976
during its initial filling due to poor design and construction
decisions. Eleven deaths were recorded while about 25,000
were left homeless and nearly three-hundred square miles
were flooded.168 A large number of poor engineering decisions
occurred, but the problems were as much institutional within
the Bureau of Reclamation as engineering: “[a]n internal
Bureau of Reclamation study states that ‘past experiences at
other dam sites may have given the USBR designers an
unwarranted sense of confidence . . . .’” 169
Similarly, a study of Hurricane Andrew’s devastating impact
on Florida attributed much of the damage to a combination of
“inappropriate design, weak building materials, poor

164. Laurie McGinley, Storm Wages Over Mobile Home Safety, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
1993, at B1.
165. Id.
166. Simon Worrall, Why Wasn’t This Town Prepared When the Big Tornado Hit?,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 8, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/07/150708twister-storm-chasers-moore-oklahoma-weather-tornado-alley-ngbooktalk/.
167. See Ann Zimmerman, Tornado Alley Weighs Costs of Safe Rooms: More
Oklahomans Back School-Safety Mandates After a Powerful Twister Killed Seven
Elementary Students Last Spring, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2013, at A3.
168. See Denis Binder, Dam Safety: The Critical Imperative, 14 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 342, 351 (1979).
169. Id. at 349.
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construction techniques, inadequate inspection and other
similar failings.”170
C.

Emergency Action Plans

Emergency action plans (EAPs) are a widely accepted
method today to respond to emergencies. They should be an
integral part of the planning process to minimize risk, if not of
the initial impact of the force of nature, but the impacts of the
impacts of the blow, and to facilitate recovery.171 EAPs need to
be site specific, risk based, and user friendly. 172 Users need to
be familiar with the plan and subject to periodic training on
it.173 EAPs also need to be updated, not gathering dust on a
shelf.174
EAPs can only be as effective as their quality and
implementation. For example, Louisiana Governor Blanco and
New Orleans Mayor Nagin had ample warning of the approach
of Hurricane Katrina, yet both dithered before calling for an
evacuation.175 The mayor was reported to have consulted with
the city’s attorneys about potential legal liability by the city to
the businesses who would lose revenue from an evacuation.176
Policymakers learn from disasters and the weaknesses of
EAPs in responding to them. The failure of the New Orleans
EAP also showed multiple problems with evacuation plans.
Provisions must exist to evacuate the elderly, infirm, and
disabled.177 Any presumption that they could be evacuated

170. Steven T. Maher, Emergency Decisionmaking During the State of Florida’s
Response to Hurricane Andrew, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1993).
171. For a discussion of emergency action plans, see Denis Binder, Emergency Action
Plans: A Legal and Practical Blueprint: Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail, 63 U. PITT.
L. REV. 791 (2002). See also Ken Lerner, Governmental Negligence Liability in Disaster
Management, 23 URB. LAW. 333 (1991).
172. See Binder, supra note 171, at 808.
173. Id. at 804.
174. Id.
175. Experts had warned that 48 hours would be needed to evacuate New Orleans.
The governor and mayor waited until twenty hours before the hurricane struck to
order a mandatory evacuation, Lisa Myers, How Much Blame Does Gov. Blanco
Deserve,
NBC
NEWS
(Oct.
11,
2005),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9613133/ns/nbc_nightly_news_with_brian_williamsnbc_news_investigates/t/how-much-blame-does-gov-blanco-deserve/.
176. Bruce Nolan, Katrina Takes Aim, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 28,
2005 at 1.
177. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-200, FEDERAL DISASTER
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with the general population was proven false by Katrina.
Another issue that arose was that some people would not leave
without their pets. Hence, a recognition now exists that
consideration must be given to this reality.178
Learning lessons from past response efforts will improve
future responses, but the reality is that the extreme forces of
nature can overwhelm the best designs and EAPs. They can
minimize the impact of these forces, but cannot defeat them.
D.

Warning Systems

One means to reduce the impacts of extreme natural
hazards is the widespread use of warning systems. Timely
warning systems allow for informed decision-making on
preparedness and deciding whether to evacuate or shelter inplace. Mass evacuations on short notice will probably be
ineffective as roads become congested and panic sets in.
Warnings about the general geological or meteorological
risks will probably be no more effective in discouraging people
from inhabiting these areas than cigarette warnings in
discouraging smoking.179 The more significant warnings,
therefore, will be those in advance of an impact, such as a
reverse 911 alert system.180 For example, the loci of a tornado
touching down may be unknown until it occurs, but
communities throughout Tornado Alley will sound their sirens
in advance of the tornado. Residents scamper to cover; they do
not wait to see where the tornado will touch. So too with
evacuation orders prior to a hurricane striking, even though
the precise path of the storm is unpredictable.
Absent flash floods or sudden dam breaks, time is usually
ASSISTANCE: FEMA’S PROGRESS IN AIDING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES COULD BE
FURTHER ENHANCED (2017).
178. The Pets Evacuation and Standards Act of 2006 (PETS) was enacted in
response to the lesson from Hurricane Katrina. Pub. L. No. 109-308, 120 Stat. 1725
(codified as passed at 42 U.S.C. § 5196a-d).
179. We are inundated with warning notices, such that we tend to ignore most of
them. See David Lazarus, Warning: People Ignore Warning Labels, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 6,
2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-warning-labels-20161206story.html.
180. Historically, the traditional tornado warning was the community’s sirens.
Today, tornado warnings are sent over radio, television, cellular text messages, and
the reverse 911 alert system. See Get to Know the Tornado Warning Systems, RAINBOW
INT’L (Apr. 21, 2016), https://rainbowintl.com/blog/get-to-know-the-tornado-warningsystems.
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available to warn of imminent flooding. Earthquakes do not
provide warnings, but warnings can be issued against ensuing
tsunamis.
An estimated 230,000–280,000 persons died in the tsunami
that followed the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake of December
26, 2004. Waves up to fifty-seven feet struck twelve
countries.181 The victims had no warnings.182 Conversely, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported in
2010 that its tsunami warning system had a 100 percent
effective rate for its area of responsibility since the 2005 fiscal
year.183
V.

THE HUMAN FACTOR

No human activity is risk free. People usually make the
right decision, rise to the occasion, and often achieve
greatness. We do not usually hear of the persons whose
decisions averted a “natural” disaster. Conversely, humans
also have a seemingly infinite way of being fallible. The reality
is that many “natural” disasters will include a human
component of fault.
People are fallible. We all have character defects. Arrogance,
vacillating, under meds, the not invented here syndrome,
avariciousness, judgment calls, indecisiveness, and fear of
making a wrong decision, characterize poor decisions. History
is full of incidents of poor leadership in crises. 184 Human risks

181. Alan Taylor, Ten Years Since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 26, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/ten-years-since-the-2004indian-ocean-tsunami/100878/.
182. The Indian Ocean lacked a tsunami warning system at that time. Andrew C.
Revkin, With No Alert System, Indian Ocean Nations Were Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/27/science/with-no-alert-systemindian-ocean-nations-were-vulnerable.html.
183. United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees,
U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: NOAA Has Expanded Its Tsunami Programs, but
Improved Planning Could Enhance Effectiveness 20 (GAO-10-10, April 2010).
184. A classic example is the Great London Fire of 1666, which consumed two-thirds
of the city, killed six, and left 200,000 homeless. Will & Ariel Durant, THE STORY OF
CIVILIZATION: PART VIII: THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV 262–63 (1963). History recorded “a
memorable instance of folly” when the Lord Mayor of London refused to either order or
permit the destruction of forty homes to create a firebreak, or even to remove the
furnishings and belongings of Lawyers of the Temple for fear of liability. See
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357, 362 (1788).
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also sadly include corruption,185 derelictions of duty, and
corner cutting.
Another human reality is that people do not heed warnings
or are even indifferent to the risks. A classic example was
eighty-three-year-old Harry Randall Truman who owned a
lodge at Spirit Lake for over fifty years near Mount St. Helens.
He was warned about the risks of the eruption but refused to
evacuate.186 He said “I’m going to stay right here because, I’ll
tell you why, my home and my (expletive deleted) life’s
here . . . . My wife and I, we both vowed years and years ago
that we’ll never leave Spirit Lake. We loved it. It’s part of me,
and I’m part of that (expletive deleted) mountain.”187
Geologic and meteorological quiescence leads to complacency
and overconfidence. The attitude is that since nothing has
happened, it must be safe. Memories are also short. Measures
to reduce risk are part of infrastructure improvements, which
involve budgetary constraints. In terms of public budget
shortages, infrastructure suffers on two overlapping realities.
First, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Second, the squeaky wheel
of infrastructure—the general belief is that because nothing
has gone wrong, it is safe. When the dam bursts, then society
pours much more into the infrastructure, much more than
preventative maintenance.188 The result is a ticking time bomb

185. For example, four state assembly speakers (Alabama, New York, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina) were indicted for corruption in 2014. Alan Greenblatt, Politics: 5
Reasons State House Speakers May Be Prone to Corruption, GOVERNING (Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-speakers-indicted-new-york-rhodeisland-south-carolina-alabama.html. California indicted three state senators for
corruption in 2014. Norimitsu Onishi, California Democrats Await Fallout After 3 Are
Caught Up in Scandals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1IEHM3E.
186. Lori Grisham, “I’m Going to Stay Right Here.” Lives Lost in Mount St. Helens
Eruption, USA TODAY (May 19, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2015/05/17/mont-sr-helens-people-states/27311467/.
187. Id.
188. A clear example is the failure of the spillway and emergency spillway at the 50year-old, 770 feet Oroville Dam this past winter. Due to low precipitation rates, the
Oroville dam does not usually have to open its spillway, much less its emergency
spillway. The 2016 winter in California was different. The dam was filling up fast and
the spillway was opened. The spillway started cracking up and the emergency spillway
turned out to be nothing more than a hill. Studies showed problems in the design of
the dam, its construction, and maintenance. In essence, cracks in the spillway were
merely patched over the years. See R. G. Bea, Preliminary Root Causes of the Oroville
Dam Gated Spillway, U.C. BERKLEY CTR. FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK MGMT, (Apr. 17,
2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3673031-OrovilleSpillwayRootCauseAnalysis.html. The low bid to repair the spillway came in at $275.4 million.
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of deferred maintenance.
Others are willing to accept general levels of risk. One
Oakland resident living on the Hayward Fault stated: “[l]iving
here is a considered risk . . . . [b]ut I love this area, and I’d
rather live to be 50 in the Bay Area than 100 in Kansas.”189
The desire to commune with nature, live with nature, exalt in
its beauty and views, and to respond to the siren calls of
natural beauty, is irresistible to many. To escape from the
crowded land and live by the sea190 is an aspiration of many.
We also deal with conscious denial of the risk—“It won’t
happen to me.” One commentator wrote of the hurricane risk
on the East Coast:
Theirs is the familiar beach barrier tale of hope against
hope, trust that shoreline engineering can fool Mother
Nature, reliance on the great faucet of Government
disaster aid and cheap storm insurance and ultimately,
denial of the obvious—that is, that all up and down the
Atlantic Coast, the sea, aided by storms and hurricanes,
is slowly but inexorably rolling up and over beaches. 191
People may often be unaware of the risk. They may not
realize, for example, that they are at risk of a flood because an
upstream dam provides a delusion of safety.
The desire often exists to rebuild in the same place in the
same way. A team of engineers recommended stricter building
codes after Hurricane Iwa struck Kauai in 1982. Their intent
was to keep roofs from blowing off structures in future
hurricanes.192 The Kauai County Council waived building
permits for “emergency repairs.”193 Permittees for the following
year were allowed to retroactively obtain permits. “Hurricane
connectors,” which attach the rafters to the wall frames, were
See also Dave Kasler, Bids for Oroville Dam Repairs Top State Estimates: $275.4
Million
the
Lowest,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Apr.
15,
2017),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-anddrought/article144848399.html.
189. With Fault Like Kobe, Fears Rise in Oakland, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at
A11.
190. I had a poster once that showed a person looking out over the ocean. The
caption was “I fled from the land and arrived at last by the infinite sea.” I recognized
the scene as being at Ocean Beach in San Francisco.
191. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Sea Threatens Costly Building, Reviving a Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at A7.
192. Hawaii Betrayed by its Leniency, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992 at A10.
193. Id.
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not required for another three years.194 Hurricane Iniki came
in 1992 to Kauai with devastating results.195
Regardless of zoning, land use plans, or planning boards,
political pressures exist to develop and build in geologically
fragile areas, such as floodplains or slippery slopes. The
development of the Big Rock Mesa in Malibu, California, is a
prime example of this costly reality.196 County engineers
recognized the instability of the slopes in the 1960s. The hills
and slopes of Malibu, with their majestic views of the ocean
and the exclusivity of the community, send out a siren call to
the affluent.197
Staff unsuccessfully tried to forestall development pending
installation of sewers for waste water development. Political
pressures overcame their opposition. Building permits were
issued and homes built. The use of septic tanks 198 and a rise in
the water table resulted in the foreseeable destabilization of
the slopes. The 1983 Big Rock Mesa landslide damaged or
destroyed 250 homes. Los Angeles County entered into a $96.8
million settlement in 1986.199
VI. CONCLUSION
Sir Francis Bacon wrote, “[n]ature to be commanded must be
obeyed . . . .”200 People often act in ignorance of this maxim.
Humans often fail to heed the lessons from nature.
The march of civilization and the American people has

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Malibu has long been known for its slippery slopes. See Sprecher v. Adamson,
636 P. 2d 1121 (Cal. 1981). As one commentator wrote: “Malibu, where the slide meets
the tide.” Rob Risley, Landslide Peril and Homeowners’ Insurance in California, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1993).
197. Id.
198. Malibu residents long opposed installation of sewers, preferring to rely on septic
tanks, and are now installing sewer systems and a wastewater treatment plant.
Martha Groves, Malibu Approves Sewage Treatment Plant, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/local/westside/la-me-0114-malibu-sewer-20150114-story.html;
Martha Groves, Septic Tanks on Their Way Out in Malibu, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/06/local/me-malibu-septic6.
199. Kenneth J. Garcia, $97-Million Settlement Over Malibu Landslide: Agreement
Requires County, Caltrans, Insurers to Pay Homeowners for Big Rock Mesa Damage,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-01-04/news/mn-124_1_bigrock-mesa.
200. FRANCIS DRAKE, THE NEW ORGANON, THE FIRST BOOK (1857).
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proven the human race is capable of prodigious feats. It can
feed the world’s population. It can mine the earth’s natural
resources in hot humid climates or bitterly freezing, sub-zero
weather. It can level mountains, bridge chasms, and make
swamps habitable through drainage, filling, and air
conditioning.
But humans cannot tame the basic primeval forces of
nature—the uncontrollable, extreme natural hazards. These
natural risks defy control by humans. The time has come to
recognize extreme natural hazards as uncontrollable events
that can defy design limits and emergency planning because of
their speed and ferocity.
Americans spent 360 years reengineering nature to fit their
needs. Earth Day on April 17, 1969 and the enactment of
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 marked the end of
the period of resource exploitation and the redesign of nature.
Scores of environmental protection statutes followed at the
federal, state, and local level. The quality of life became as
critical as the quantity of life. The paradigm shifted from
resource exploitation to resource conservation. Minimum
stream flows were imposed on rivers to protect fish and
habitat. The Age of the Big Dam was over.201
Yet, natural hazards persist in spite of the engineering of
America. Indeed, much of America is dependent on a century
of pre-Earth Day infrastructure. We have to accept, and do
accept, a degree of risk in our habitations. It is impossible in as
vast and diverse society as the United States to protect against
all threats everywhere in the country. Structures fail. Systems
malfunction. Humans err.
Let us understand that we can temper many of the forces of
nature, but can never tame nature. Engineers have done a
remarkable record of containing most, but not all, natural
risks. Uncontrollable risks defy their best efforts. We can, for
example, stop most flooding, but not cases of extreme
precipitation when flood waters reach the flood levels of a
river.
To the extent that we cannot control the forces of nature, we

201. See Professor Zygmunt Plater’s graphic discussion of the Tellico Dam saga,
which marked the end of the Big Dam Era. ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER
AND THE DAM: HOW PORK-BARREL POLITICS ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A
RIVER 342–52 (2013).
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need to prepare in advance to reduce the impacts.
Earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and tsunamis will not be
deterred by our acts, but the damages and impact can be
reduced through a number of actions. Humans are not helpless
against even extreme acts of nature.
The time has come to recognize these uncontrollable,
extreme forces of nature as phenomena unto themselves.
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